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Abstract 
 
 
Turkey’s customs union with the European Union in 1996 increased considerably 
import penetration in manufacturing while not significantly affecting the share of EU 
in Turkey’s trade. The study analyzes whether this impetus had a marked impact on 
the productive and industrial structure of manufacturing in Turkey, and on its 
competitive behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Various forms of economic integration with the European Union (EU) are on the top 
of the agenda for the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. By enacting a 
customs union (CU) with the EU in 1996, Turkey took a major step in that direction. 
Evaluating the impact of this CU for Turkey - and its policy implications - are 
therefore important both for Turkey and for the other Mediterranean countries that 
have various types of economic association with the EU.  
 
Since the CU largely excludes agriculture, this study analyzes the impact of the CU 
on Turkish manufacturing industry - at the sectoral level.  Only six years have elapsed 
since the CU (1996-2001), and the latest definitive data on the manufacturing industry 
pertain to 1999. The intention of the study is to set up a framework with which the 
anaysis can be updated periodically enabling a more accurate evaluation of the CU. 
 
1.1 Trade liberalization and the Customs Union 
Trade regime stood at the core of the reform process the Turkish economy has been 
undergoing since 1980.  Vigorously followed export promotion policies, as well as 
more gradually introduced import liberalization policies, had a profound impact on 
the manufacturing industry.  The State Institute of Statistics data reveal that the share 
of manufacturing in exports has gone up from 36% in 1980 to 79.1% in 1987 and 
stood at 91.4% in 2000.   
 
Import penetration ratios in Turkish manufacturing, calculated as the ratio of imports 
to apparent consumption (domestic production plus imports minus exports), increased 
considerably since the 1980s. This has accelerated with the Customs Union (CU) with 
the EU. In addition to import penetration ratios, nominal protection rates are also 
important in judging the competitive pressures that industries face. 
 
In the 1970 Additional Protocol to the Association Treaty of 1963, Turkish imports 
from the European Community were divided into two lists.  There was a 12-year list 
for industrial products that Turkey was likely to reach international competitiveness 
relatively faster, and the rest of the manufactured goods were placed on a 22-year list.  
With the CU that went into effect in 1996 Turkey has reduced the nominal protection 
rates in trade with EU for all of the commodities in the 12- and 22- year lists.  For 
commodities that were not included in the 12- and 22-year lists but covered under the 
European Coal and Steel Community agreement, a separate Free Trade Agreement 
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was signed in 1995 between Turkey and EU, which stipulated that trade of 
commodities covered under the agreement would be gradually liberalized over a 
period of three years.  Thus, by 1999 the nominal protection rates for all industrial 
products when traded with EU have been reduced to zero.  It has been calculated that 
while the average nominal protection rates with EU had been calculated as 10.22% as 
of 1994, they have fallen on average to 1.34% by 1999 (see, Togan 1997). Moreover, 
the EU-Turkey customs union agreement requires Turkey to adopt the Customs Union 
Tariff of EU against third country imports by January 1, 1996, and all of the 
preferential agreements EU has concluded with third countries by the year 2001. 
 
Also, the enactment of Competition Law and the establishment of the Competition 
Authority have largely been due to Turkey's obligation under the Association 
Agreement. The Association Agreement required that the parties should apply the 
provisions of Rome Treaty for the harmonization of their laws, tax rules, and 
competition policies. 
 
1.2 Trade Pattern and Ratios 
Table 1. gives the export-output and import penetration (imports/apparent 
consumption) ratios in manufacturing for the relevant sub-periods following the trade 
liberalization of 1980. The share of imports from  and exports to the EU in, 
respectively, total imports and exports are also depicted. 
 
The only striking change in the trade pattern following the CU was the major increase 
in overall import penetration ratios. This ratio increased from 14% in the early 1990s 
to nearly 20% in the post-CU period. Remarkably, the share of EU imports in imports 
from all sources slightly declined from 54% to 51% in the two periods compared. 
 
Given the relatively low level of the common external tariffs, and the large size of the 
EU, this observation is consistent with the intuitive prediction that trade creation 
would dominate trade diversion. Put differently, for Turkey, the multilateral 
liberalization aspect of the CU dominated over its preferential impact. 
 
Following the CU, import penetration ratios doubled or nearly doubled in many 
sectors of manufacturing. It can be expected that such an impetus would have an 
important impact on the productive and industrial structure of manufacturing in 
Turkey, and on its competitive behavior.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 4
1.3 Previous Studies 
Systematic empirical studies on the impact or probable impact of the CU on Turkish 
manufacturing industry are very sparse. Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGS) model, addressed the issue in 1996, analyzing 
the potential overall impact of the CU on welfare. CGE estimations and simulations of 
Bayar et al. (2000) provided some indication of the direction and magnitude of 
changes in major sectors of the economy. Kucukahmetoglu (2000) conducted a study 
based on changes in revealed comparative (RCA) advantage indices. Erzan and 
Filiztekin (1997) analysed the probable impact of the CU on the structure of 
manufacturing industry in terms of small, medium and large firms, using panel data 
techniques. 
 
The CU has both liberalization (trade creation) and trade diversion aspects. There are 
earlier studies on the impact of trade liberalization.  Krueger and Tuncer (1982) 
reported that productivity growth was faster during the periods of liberalization. 
Similarly, Nishimizu and Robinson (1984) find that for most industries, productivity 
growth was increasing with export expansion. Both of these studies cover the1963-
1976 highly protectionist period. The paper by Levinsohn (1993) was the first one that 
exploited the reforms in 1980. However, the major concern of Levinsohn was to test 
imports as a market discipline hypothesis. His results showed that for majority of 
industries, removing barriers to import decreases market power. Foroutan (1996) as a 
part of a World Bank funded project, examined total factor productivity between 
years 1976-1985. She concluded that industries that were classified as exportables 
grew faster after 1980. She also reported that there was small but significant 
disciplining effect of trade on market power.  
 
Filiztekin (2000) explored the impact of trade reforms on the growth performance of 
Turkish manufacturing industry in the 1970-1996 period. He also addressed whether 
the observed growth in value added was due to accumulation of factors of production 
or rather improvement in productivity, whether the growth phenomenon was uniform 
across industries and whether there were certain industries that led the rest. The 
relation between trade and productivity growth, especially the effects of export 
growth and changes in imports on productivity were also tested. 
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1.4 Data 
The data are obtained from the Annual Surveys of Manufacturing Industry conducted 
by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS).  The surveys defined 20 industries until 1973, 
and since then, the classification system has changed to identify 29 industries.  
Throughout the paper, we used a dual approach with respect to data.  Where possible, 
we used the 28-industry classification (the food and beverage industry is collapsed in 
many other statistics, thus we had to consider these two industries as one) and the 
(consistently constructed) 20-industry classification otherwise.  This was specifically 
the case in constructing the capital stock data.  
 
The surveys cover establishments with ten or more persons engaged. The data 
differentiate public enterprises from private ones.  The study pertains to private 
manufacturing industry because of the arbitrary decision making in the public 
enterprises. This differntiation reduced our number of sectors to 27 because of the 
mainly publicly owned oil refining industry. 
  
The variables used in the rest of the report are defined as follows.  Real value added 
and real gross output are calculated by dividing the nominal value added and nominal 
gross output by sectoral price deflators, respectively.  Sectoral price deflators exist for 
the 1982-1997 period at a monthly frequency starting with 1981. For each industry, 
the sectoral deflator is extrapolated for the early years using the relation between each 
deflator and consumer price index, oil prices and a set of time related variables after 
1982. 
 
Labor input is total number of persons engaged.  Man-hour data are available only 
after 1980 and they are not reported for some small establishments in several 
industries in particular years.  None of the results related to post 1980 do change 
qualitatively if man-hour data are used instead of persons engaged.  Furthermore, 
when wages are calculated, we used total number of workers instead of persons 
engaged, because they include owners or other family workers that re not paid any 
wages and salaries.   
The surveys report current value investment figures for each industry.  The finer 
distinction for newly purchased goods are not available.  The nominal investment 
figures are deflated by an aggregate investment deflator.  The deflator values for post 
1980 period was taken from Treasury Department.  Data on earlier years are from 
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OECD National Accounts.  Treasury deflator was extrapolated using OECD data for 
years prior to 1980.  
Given the series of real investment, the capital stock is a function of past investment 
flows. The choice of function is somewhat arbitrary, since information about asset 
types, asset lives and depreciation patterns across industries are not available.  Two 
different functions are entertained in this paper, both yielding very close estimates.  
The first one is the perpetual inventory method.  The initial level of capital stock is 
approximated by taking the ratio of investment value added in 1950 to the sum of 
investment value added ratio in the next ten years.  Given positive depreciation rates 
and long investment series prior to the initial date, the perpetual inventory approach is 
fairly robust to the choice of capital stock estimate for the first year.  Then 
investments are added to the capital stock by adjusting for depreciation in the existing 
stock.   
The second approach is to construct the capital stock as a delayed linear scrapping 
rule.  This method adds newly purchased capital good to the capital stock and after a 
period of s years. A constant proportion, 1/(m+1), is scrapped every year.   
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where Kit is the capital stock of industry i at time t, I is real investment.  This is the 
formula used by the OECD in it’s Intersectoral Database for international 
comparisons (OECD,1996).  Following Harrigan (1999) s is chosen as 3 years and m 
as 7 years and the capital stock is calculated from 1960 onwards.  The capital stock 
estimates reported in this paper use the delayed scrapping approach. 
To analyze market structure, we use two different approaches.  First we use three 
standard measures of concentration.  The first two are four-firm and eight-firm 
concentration ratios and the third one is a Herfindahl index, ∑
=
=
N
1n
2
it,nit sH , where N is 
total number of establishments in industry i at time t, and s is the output share of nth 
firm in that industry.  These measures are taken from Gunes (1995). 
Trade data are taken from the World Bank Trade and Production Database.  The 
database contains imports and export data at the industry level by blocs of countries 
over the period 1980-1999.  We were able to identify Turkey’s imports and exports to 
European Union, United States of America and to the rest of the world.   
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2. Growth and Productivity 
 
2.1 Growth 
 
1980 was a decisive year in which the economy changed its orientation. Post 1980 
period is divided into three sub-periods. The first one starts in 1981 and ends in 1988.  
The 1989-1995 period corresponds to two major changes in the economy.  As a result 
of free elections after a period of political oppression, and the strong pressures by 
trade unions, real wages increased drastically in 1989, catching up their pre-1980 
level.  1989 was also the year when the capital account was fully liberalized.  The 
final sub-period, 1995-1999, captures the CU with the EU.  
 
The first column in Table 2 provides annual average growth rate of value added in 
aggregate manufacturing. The growth rate during the last decade of import 
substituting industrialization, 1970-1980, was a mere 1.3% (as industry was paralyzed 
by 1977), which jumped to 10% as the economy was opened to trade.  
The second column provides annual growth rates of employment. The annual 
employment growth was 4.5% during the 1970s. This should be viewed against the 
background of very high population growth rates (2.6% per annum) and mass 
migration from rural areas to urban centers (1.3% per annum). In the 1980s, with 
suppressed real wages, opening up of the economy increased annual employment 
growth to 4.9%. However, from 1989 onwards, as real wages were restored and the 
capital account opened, the average employment growth fell rapidly to 1.8%. In the 
post-CU era, annual employment growth recovered to 3.4%. 
 
Table 2. Growth Performance of Manufacturing, 1970-1999 (%) 
Value Added Employment
 
Capital Stock 
 
1970-1980 1.32 4.48 13.84 
1981-1988 9.69 4.91 2.86 
1989-1995 10.32 1.80 6.90 
1996-1999 10.20 3.43 10.75 
1981-1999 10.03 3.45 6.01 
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The third column is growth in capital stock. In the 1970s, despite severe balance of 
payments crises, capital accumulation had a remarkable 13.8% average.  Following 
the trade liberalization of 1980, capital accumulation slowed down considerably.  
After the wage hike and opening up of the capital account in1989, it picked up to 
6.9%. With the CU, annual growth rate of capital accumulation reached 10.8%. 
 
 
2.2 Productivity 
Two measures of productivity are analyzed.  The first one is labor productivity, 
simply the ratio of real value added to labor input.  While it is a very simple and non-
parametric measure of productivity, it measures the contribution of only one factor 
input, and hence cannot differentiate whether high productivity is a result of technical 
efficiency or due to increase in other inputs, particularly capital.  The second measure 
of productivity is total factor productivity (TFP), defined as the residual after the 
contribution of accumulation of all factors is removed from output growth.  More 
formally, suppose the value added is produced by using two inputs, labor and capital, 
and technology, A: 
 Y = F(A,K,L) (1) 
Differentiating this function will yield: 
 
A
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Y
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L
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Y
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K
dK
Y
KF
Y
dY ALK ++=  (2) 
where FJ is partial derivative of production function, F, with respect to input J.  
Assuming that the elasticity of technology is unity (or simply assuming that 
technology is Hicks-neutral), with some manipulation one obtains: 
 
A
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K
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K
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L
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K
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Y
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where sJ is the share of Jth input total revenue, µ is the markup and γ is the returns to 
scale parameter.   
Under the assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, that is 
when µ = γ = 1 = sK + sL, Equation (3) reduces to 
 
L
dLs
K
dKs
Y
dY
A
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LK
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−−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛  (4) 
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The term (dA/A)SR is simply the residual growth of value added after the contribution 
of inputs are removed and is called the Solow residual. This is used as a measure of 
“total factor productivity” (TFP). 
 
Table 3. Labor Productivity and Total Factor Productivity Growth, 1970-1999 (%) 
      
 
Labor Productivity TFP 
 
1970-1980 -3.16 -9.38
1981-1988 4.77 6.18
1989-1995 8.52 4.49
1996-1999 6.78 0.88
1981-1999 6.57 4.44
 
There was a significant gain in labor productivity after the economy opened to trade 
in 1980.  A further improvement in labor productivity was observed after 1988 when 
real wages increased drastically.  However, in the period following the CU with the 
EU in 1996, the annual average growth of labor productivity fell from 8.5% to 6.8%. 
It was observed that TFP growth recovered after 1980, reaching the level as high as 
6.2% per annum in the first phase of liberalization and dropping to 4.5% thereafter. 
The decline in the growth rate of TFP in the second sub-period was a consequence of 
the 1994 crisis. In fact, restricting the sample period to 1988-1993, the TFP growth 
was even faster, reaching 9.2% per year. The drastic increase in real wages forced 
firms to substitute capital for labor and increase efficiency and productivity of 
existing inputs.   
A major decline was observed for years following the CU with the EU. In fact, the 
decline started in 1994 and persisted until 1996. A strong recovery in 1997 was then 
offset by a strong decline in 1998.  In the last year of the sample there was another 
recovery of the TFP. Nevertheless, the average TPF growth in the post-CU years of 
the sample was only 0.9%. The boom-bust performance of the economy in the recent 
years may have dominated the erratic behavior of TFP rather than the impact of the 
CU. 
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2.3 Growth Accounting 
Growth accounting is a decomposition of value added growth into its components 
obtained by re-arranging Equation (4). The purpose of the growth accounting exercise 
is to determine whether the source of growth is due to factor accumulation or 
technological improvement, represented by TFP growth.  The results are reported in 
Table 4. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Average annual value added growth in manufacturing was about 10% during the 
whole period under study. The increased labor input accounted for 12% of that in the 
first sub-period, 1981-1988, and considerably lower in the following sub-periods. The 
bulk of growth came from capital accumulation and technological improvement. 
However, the shares of the two factors changed drastically. The contribution of TFP 
declined first from 64% to 44%, then to 9% in the post-CU era. In this latter period, 
capital accumulation alone accounted for 86% of value added growth. Individually, in 
most sectors, TFP contribution was significantly negative, only compensated by 
capital accumulation.  
 
3. The Impact of Trade on Industry Structure an Performance 
 
Table 5 below presents the evolution of various market concentration indicators in 
Turkish manufacturing industries over the 1980-1998 period. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
Table 6 below shows the results of the regression relating foreign trade variables to 
market concentration.  With a one-year lag, import penetration (IMPPEN) 
significantly affects market concentration as measured by CR4.  The higher the 
import penetration in a manufacturing industry in a given year, the lower is the market 
concentration in the following year.  Export/Output ratio (X/O), on the other hand, 
does not affect market concentration.  Given that market concentration will typically 
mean more competition and, hence, lower prices, this result supports the imports-as-
market-discipline hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 11
 
Table 6. Impact of Foreign Trade Variables on Market Concentration (CR4) 
 
Regression with robust standard errors 
No. of obs    = 405 
F( 46,   358) = 341.97 
Prob > F      = 0.0000 
R-squared    = 0.9185 
Root MSE   = 0.05713 
 Coef. Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
t P > ⏐t ⏐ 
(X/O)-1 - 0.061 0.054 -1.11 0.267 
(X/0)-2 - 0.274 0.051 -0.53 0.594 
(X/O)-3 - 0.213 0.044 -0.48 0.632 
IMPPEN-1 - 0.309*** 0.090 -3.43 0.001 
IMPPEN-2 - 0.026 0.110 -0.24 0.809 
IMPPEN-3 - 0.009 0.093 -0.10 0.917 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 7 below shows that including the share of EU in Turkish exports and imports 
does not alter the previous result that, among independent variables considered, 
import penetration with one year lag is the only significant determinant of market 
concentration in the manufacturing industry.  Again, import penetration significantly 
reduces market concentration in the following year.  (MEU denotes the share of EU in 
total imports in Turkish manufacturing industries, and XEU denotes share of exports 
to EU in total exports of Turkish manufacturing industries.) 
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Table 7. Impact of Trade With EU on Market Concentration (CR4) 
 
Regression with robust standard errors 
No. of obs    = 405 
F( 52,   352) = 320.98 
Prob > F      = 0.0000 
R-squared    = 0.9205 
Root MSE   = 0.05691 
 Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
t P > ⏐t ⏐ 
(X/O)-1 - 0.066 0.054 - 1.23 0.219 
(X/0)-2 - 0.031 0.051 - 0.61 0.540 
(X/O)-3 - 0.021 0.046 - 0.46 0.643 
IMPPEN-1 - 0.329*** 0.092 - 3.56 0.000 
IMPPEN-2 - 0.041 0.108 - 0.38 0.701 
IMPPEN-3 0.014 0.093 0.16 0.876 
MEU-1 - 0.028 0.037 - 0.77 0.441 
MEU-2 - 0.021 0.041 - 0.53 0.594 
MEU-3 0.004 0.028 0.15 0.883 
XEU-1 0.038 0.032 1.18 0.240 
XEU-2 0.034 0.034 1.02 0.309 
XEU-3 - 0.036 0.030 -1.21 0.227 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 8 below presents the results of the regression that tests how market 
concentration affects the share of exports in output.  The results indicate that an 
increase in market concentration leads to a decrease in exports with a one year lag.  
Presumably, a high market concentration is correlated with high markups and high 
profitability in the domestic market, which will reduce incentives for searching 
markets abroad.  On the other hand, a decrease in market concentration will be 
expected to lower profitability and force firms to search for opportunities abroad.  
This result also indicates that large firms that are able to exercise market power do not 
search for export markets vigorously. 
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Table 8. Impact of Market Concentration (CR4) on Share of Exports in Output 
 
Regression with robust standard errors 
No. of obs    = 459 
F( 52,   352) = 41.96 
Prob > F      = 0.0000 
R-squared    = 0.7570 
Root MSE   = 0.06212 
 Coef. Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
T P > ⏐t ⏐ 
CR4-1 - 0.219*** 0.093 -2.36 0.019 
CR4-2 0.253 0.179  1.42 0.157 
CR4-3 - 0.90 0.140 -0.65 0.518 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
The impact of market concentration on import penetration is again negative and it 
filters through with a one-year lag.  This result points at a situation where market 
concentration acts as an entry barrier against competition from imports. 
 
 
Table 9. Impact of Market Concentration (CR4) on Import Penetration 
 
Regression with robust standard errors 
No. of obs    = 459 
F( 52,   352) = 93.73 
Prob > F      = 0.0000 
R-squared    = 0.9154 
Root MSE   = 0.04933 
 Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
T P > ⏐t ⏐ 
CR4-1 - 0.164** 0.077 -2.13 0.034 
CR4-2 0.022 0.094  0.24 0.810 
CR4-3 - 0.048 0.073 -0.66 0.509 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Turkey’s CU with the EU in 1996 increased considerably import penetration in 
manufacturing while not significantly affecting the share of EU in Turkey’s trade.  
 
Given the relatively low level of the common external tariffs, and the large size of the 
EU, this observation is consistent with the intuitive prediction that trade creation 
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would dominate trade diversion. Put differently, for Turkey, the multilateral 
liberalization aspect of the CU dominated over its preferential impact. 
 
Following the CU, import penetration ratios doubled or nearly doubled in many 
sectors of manufacturing. It can be expected that such an impetus would have an 
important impact on the productive and industrial structure of manufacturing in 
Turkey, and on its competitive behavior. 
 
We first analyzed growth in value added, employment and capital accumulation. 
Annual average growth in manufacturing value added was about 10% throughout the 
whole period since 1980. Employment growth and capital accumulation, on the other 
hand, picked up considerably in the post-CU era from the depressed levels of 1989-
1995. These improvements, however, were not reflected in productivity growth. 
Labor productivity somewhat declined, but most remarkably, annual average 
productivity growth that was attributable to technological improvement declined to a 
record level of below 1%. The source of growth in manufacturing industry was 
essentially due to capital accumulation in the post-CU era.  
 
One probable explanation to this phenomenon is preemptive capacity building in 
anticipation of tougher competition and/or the incentive to exploit potential export 
opportunities. Another explanation is the structural disarray due to the impact of 
considerably higher levels of import penetration. 
 
There was a two-way relation between industry concentration and import penetration. 
Higher concentration significantly reduced import penetration. However, once 
imports managed to penetrate, they significantly reduced industry concentration. 
 
High industry concentration was not only resisting import penetration. High 
concentration was also hampering export growth. There was a significant negative 
relation between high concentration and export/output ratios in the following years. 
 
The results indicate that imports work as market discipline, but have to be 
complemented with competition policy. 
 
It should also be noted that the trade shares of the EU did not affect industry 
concentrations.  It was import penetration from all sources that mattered. Hence, as a 
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result of the CU, imports did have a disciplining effect on Turkish manufacturing, but 
not the EU. 
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Table 1. Trade Ratios and Trade Shares, 1981-1999 (%) 
  Export-Output Ratio Import Penetration Sh. Of Imp. from EU in Tot Imp Sh. Of Exp. to EU in Tot Exp 
  1981-1988 1989-1995 1996-1999 1981-1988 1989-1995 1996-1999 1981-1988 1989-1995 1996-1999 1981-1988 1989-1995 1996-1999 
311Food 10,48 11,31 11,95 4,22 5,91 6,62 56,32 31,94 35,65 37,78 51,49 48,28 
313Beverage 1,04 1,51 1,96 0,57 0,46 0,69 58,69 86,97 60,32 19,82 27,09 28,47 
314Tobacco 13,09 1,29 2,84 3,68 7,20 7,89 15,79 4,83 6,32 18,04 13,51 20,58 
321Textiles 19,15 20,09 25,61 2,80 6,42 11,65 46,09 31,84 42,25 70,01 69,77 60,52 
322Clothing  59,31 42,39 45,89 0,52 0,51 3,62 61,22 73,30 71,89 81,67 76,93 66,81 
323Leather 4,28 10,77 11,37 7,07 25,47 24,87 81,32 68,76 66,40 60,93 65,34 45,85 
324Footwear 7,00 15,98 17,76 1,85 7,24 14,20 67,26 30,51 70,39 36,22 25,01 16,32 
331Wood 7,18 4,23 5,83 2,81 3,42 8,67 59,61 53,17 48,39 18,79 27,07 22,84 
332Furniture 17,07 6,31 8,21 3,91 6,20 12,40 83,77 87,15 83,65 10,20 30,52 43,96 
341Paper 2,91 2,87 6,09 8,30 15,10 28,43 45,59 59,22 61,95 2,67 16,96 15,25 
342Printing 1,28 0,58 1,09 2,01 3,12 3,16 79,56 81,27 80,73 48,84 45,44 30,44 
351Chemicals 9,75 11,86 11,72 31,02 35,31 50,45 52,81 55,02 57,59 24,07 42,34 39,20 
352Other Chemicals 2,74 4,37 6,51 9,48 12,02 18,18 61,90 72,04 72,60 31,55 18,22 12,06 
354Misc. Products of Petroleum 0,26 0,26 0,45 1,16 2,01 4,66 61,84 64,03 47,88 39,51 59,41 28,45 
355Rubber 4,62 13,01 17,69 4,43 8,64 14,43 59,21 63,81 67,15 24,89 35,51 59,02 
356Plastics 3,73 3,23 6,68 2,35 6,99 10,90 71,93 77,86 70,38 11,03 27,04 19,41 
361Pottery 3,42 3,53 10,02 1,11 2,08 5,31 62,61 59,17 66,22 55,27 78,23 75,30 
362Glass and Products 14,76 15,40 18,81 3,03 6,35 11,50 73,24 70,84 68,92 38,94 52,73 45,05 
369Other non-metallic 1,91 5,24 7,72 3,63 3,52 3,46 73,72 79,61 81,81 24,91 47,39 40,42 
371Iron & steel 9,64 14,82 15,83 13,21 14,05 16,13 61,34 48,85 43,94 20,12 12,43 25,11 
372Non-ferr. Metals 5,43 8,81 13,53 14,92 18,49 29,29 57,42 40,27 34,60 13,34 41,89 43,67 
381Fabricated Metal 7,03 6,66 10,71 18,51 26,28 27,79 43,38 62,72 60,80 20,39 42,70 41,60 
382Machinery 8,55 4,36 10,35 40,60 39,26 51,98 60,29 68,64 67,04 36,98 42,15 43,60 
383Electrical Machinery 4,69 9,65 17,64 25,15 24,41 35,54 40,17 58,75 69,14 23,31 64,26 64,03 
384Motor Vehicles 3,07 4,28 11,27 22,58 20,52 29,95 69,94 53,20 63,29 32,44 45,44 45,28 
385Prof&scientific equip. 20,81 6,47 7,47 77,53 57,26 56,21 57,98 58,93 58,06 51,08 38,59 46,19 
390Others 13,58 19,94 40,94 13,04 31,93 45,76 62,42 53,69 49,88 24,37 52,97 30,30 
              
 Total 9,16 10,34 13,50 12,22 14,20 19,94 55,25 55,49 59,61 49,78 54,12 50,75 
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Table 4. Growth Accounting, 1981-1999 (%) 
 1981-1988 1989-1995 1996-1999 
 
Value  
Added Labor Capital TFP 
Value 
Added Labor Capital TFP 
Value 
Added Labor Capital TFP 
Food 7.90 12.62 53.61 33.83 8.25 -0.04 60.03 40.06 3.61 14.16 280.81 -196.06
Beverage 7.18 9.45 152.08 -61.42 9.67 -4.38 -15.21 119.54 -5.18 1.70 296.26 -397.74
Tobacco 13.68 2.33 112.26 -14.60 24.88 0.71 106.80 -7.30 -8.39 -12.26 139.15 -227.56
Textiles 6.57 13.10 44.82 42.06 8.23 1.26 34.77 63.88 11.30 14.24 107.83 -22.19 
Clothing incl. Footwear 27.96 17.64 24.70 57.59 10.17 12.40 161.84 -73.94 -6.00 -10.41 165.47 -255.33
Leather 7.12 20.84 -20.56 99.73 13.14 1.48 13.85 84.66 -10.42 -6.17 322.54 -416.80
Wood 4.01 9.49 -90.49 181.00 15.63 -1.80 72.92 28.64 1.59 51.14 765.52 -714.85
Furniture 18.43 10.76 14.00 75.25 5.78 16.53 137.64 -54.20 17.61 14.33 114.97 -29.29 
Paper 13.56 10.27 46.60 43.14 9.62 6.40 12.27 81.23 20.89 -1.22 57.66 43.72 
Printing 10.54 15.51 -2.37 86.83 -4.04 -6.10 344.34 -438.47 -1.69 17.05 305.55 -420.59
Chemicals 12.45 6.15 30.84 62.97 5.53 22.89 16.82 61.28 12.31 -19.88 59.11 60.07 
Misc. Products of Petroleum 5.40 7.00 -84.18 177.18 2.85 -2.99 472.07 -369.66 -2.53 35.91 367.20 -503.50
Rubber 11.67 8.14 51.52 40.21 7.34 -13.93 132.85 -18.87 -4.63 8.38 98.44 -206.04
Pottery, Glass & Minerals 7.19 13.78 10.39 75.68 9.90 -4.45 91.54 13.22 2.49 39.62 257.63 -198.75
Iron & steel and Non-ferr. Metals 12.28 8.50 0.09 91.39 9.64 -3.94 24.91 79.08 9.15 3.08 63.57 33.53 
Fabricated Metal 8.78 11.09 -4.28 92.98 10.76 -2.61 118.98 -16.25 18.72 8.63 5.87 85.52 
Machinery 9.99 9.28 -48.16 138.92 9.57 -3.95 28.73 75.24 10.69 5.65 89.73 4.49 
Electrical Machinery 11.25 9.52 44.76 45.54 18.51 -0.30 21.76 78.57 19.99 10.08 27.22 62.74 
Motor Vehicles 13.57 11.06 48.34 40.65 13.77 5.70 49.56 44.69 -1.76 17.51 334.25 -451.25
Plastics nec., Instruments and Others 7.45 18.01 39.01 43.25 18.07 3.24 62.00 34.77 27.14 4.90 58.72 36.45 
                 
Total 9.69 11.93 24.22 63.82 10.32 2.30 54.27 43.48 10.20 5.23 86.08 8.58 
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Table 5. Industry Concentration in Manufacturing, 1980-1998 
 CR4 (%) CR8 (%) Herfindahl Index 
 1980-1998 1980-1988 1989-1995 1996-1998 1980-1998 1980-1988 1989-1995 1996-1998 1980-1998 1980-1988 1989-1995 1996-1998 
Food 12,26 11,40 13,44 12,09 18,72 17,95 19,93 18,17 0,85 0,78 0,94 0,82 
Other Food 20,91 23,18 18,68 19,30 29,49 31,20 27,63 28,67 2,01 2,42 1,59 1,74 
Beverage 40,38 46,71 33,06 38,48 57,43 63,34 50,36 56,23 6,90 8,62 4,98 6,20 
Tobacco 61,43 62,41 61,53 58,22 77,98 77,94 78,34 77,28 12,43 13,06 11,90 11,80 
Textiles 8,48 9,45 8,20 6,22 14,49 15,86 14,31 10,82 0,63 0,73 0,61 0,41 
Clothing  12,34 19,40 5,65 6,77 18,09 26,62 9,93 11,55 1,21 2,11 0,38 0,45 
Leather 21,88 18,66 26,69 20,36 34,05 29,47 40,50 32,70 2,37 1,95 3,00 2,17 
Footwear 43,28 50,69 37,25 35,16 59,06 65,39 53,96 51,95 7,90 10,55 5,91 4,57 
Wood 22,01 17,32 23,13 33,48 34,24 28,94 35,38 47,47 2,49 1,85 2,52 4,32 
Furniture 44,82 46,14 43,83 43,20 58,50 58,60 59,34 56,24 7,87 9,24 6,38 7,21 
Paper 30,39 38,13 24,91 19,96 46,33 54,62 41,64 32,43 4,16 5,59 3,17 2,18 
Printing 46,13 38,11 53,24 53,62 58,64 53,11 62,82 65,51 7,66 5,12 9,31 11,43 
Chemicals 47,41 41,83 52,74 51,74 64,90 61,18 68,69 67,24 8,59 6,85 10,45 9,49 
Other Chemicals 21,82 22,37 22,33 18,99 35,17 36,01 35,83 31,09 2,44 2,45 2,57 2,12 
Refineries 98,67 99,27 98,23 97,89 100,00 100,00 100,00 99,99 32,82 36,20 30,02 29,19 
Misc. Products of Petroleum 68,98 67,09 73,68 63,68 86,60 87,25 88,65 79,87 18,11 15,95 22,56 14,21 
Rubber 71,83 70,72 72,37 73,90 80,98 81,62 80,58 79,99 15,53 14,55 16,05 17,26 
Plastics 20,42 21,40 20,40 17,52 31,24 31,94 30,84 30,07 1,92 2,01 1,89 1,72 
Pottery 62,08 63,87 58,90 64,09 82,73 83,45 81,42 83,65 13,72 15,31 11,45 14,25 
Glass and Products 56,53 62,19 53,40 46,83 78,76 83,03 77,66 68,49 10,57 12,38 9,56 7,48 
Other non-metallic 18,68 18,33 19,62 17,56 31,38 30,17 33,69 29,64 2,00 1,99 2,11 1,81 
Iron & steel 39,08 44,79 34,00 33,79 52,58 57,19 48,67 47,85 5,72 7,17 4,46 4,33 
Non-ferr. Metals 46,48 48,79 46,01 40,66 62,78 66,43 61,54 54,72 7,21 7,78 7,09 5,79 
Fabricated Metal 15,94 14,96 18,23 13,49 23,46 22,68 25,30 21,51 1,33 1,25 1,56 1,06 
Machinery 40,00 37,57 44,42 37,01 53,58 49,92 58,70 52,61 5,62 4,62 7,33 4,63 
Electrical Machinery 26,05 23,80 28,10 28,04 39,98 36,18 43,81 42,46 2,96 2,58 3,38 3,16 
Motor Vehicles 39,88 35,64 46,58 36,92 56,82 53,90 60,16 57,79 5,73 4,72 7,33 5,03 
Prof&scientific equip. 42,74 34,28 48,31 55,13 57,84 50,79 63,65 65,43 8,20 5,11 9,55 14,34 
Others 32,90 38,34 29,61 24,25 45,80 49,02 43,97 40,38 5,06 6,82 3,69 3,01 
             
Average 38,41 38,86 38,50 36,84 51,43 51,85 51,63 49,72 7,03 7,23 6,96 6,63 
 
